



**TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
ZIMBABWE**
the coalition against corruption

ZIMBABWE BRIBE PAYERS INDEX 2021



The dynamics of bribery
within Zimbabwe's
Public Sector

ABOUT TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL ZIMBABWE

Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI Z) is a non-profit, non-partisan, systems-oriented local chapter of the international movement against corruption. Its broad mandate is to fight corruption and promote transparency, accountability, and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of society. TI Z believes corruption can only be sufficiently tackled by all citizens including people at grassroots level.

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FOREWORD

Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI Z) was motivated to commission a National Bribes Payers Index (NBPI) study in 2021 after noting an increase in reports of public sector corruption in its numerous engagements with diverse stakeholders. To put the issue into perspective, the 10th edition of the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) - Africa (2019) showed that more than one in four people who accessed public services, such as health care and education, paid a bribe in the previous year. "This is equivalent to approximately 130 million citizens in the 35 countries surveyed."

In Zimbabwe, TI Z had noted a rise in systemic corruption in many public institutions contributing to poor service delivery. In our view, the increase in corruption in the public sector is as a result of high levels of impunity, weak institutions, and the view of corruption as a form of survival.

Whilst there is a consensus amongst various stakeholders on the increased levels of corruption in the public sector regionally and locally, we noted limited composite data for reference and comparing the extent of corruption within various sectors, since the first local iteration of the NBPI was commissioned in 2013.

The first NBPI was conducted by TI Z and Deloitte in 2013, with that edition focusing on the state of integrity in the private sector in Zimbabwe.

In 2019 approximately **130 million** citizens in **35 African countries** paid a bribe

The survey covered **10** provinces reaching out to **2,583** respondents

Whilst that edition focused on private sector corruption, it indicated that there was high demand for bribes in the constant business interaction between the private sector players and between the private sector and the state. The findings indicated that there is high demand for, or acceptance of bribes by public officials. In other words, there was transferability of corruption from public and political institutions to the private sector.

This report is the result of a national level survey covering all ten provinces in the country and reaching out to 2,583 respondents based in both rural and urban areas. A mixed methods approach in the gathering of data was employed, merging data collected from survey questionnaires, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). As the study will show, bribery is still rampant in most public institutions, with more than half of citizens indicating that they have paid a bribe within the last 12 months.

This demonstrates that the problem of public sector corruption has persisted and grown in the country to the present day.

The rising levels of public sector corruption should worry everybody given the centrality of the public sector in guaranteeing citizens social, political and economic rights. Moreover, since the 2013 NBPI, the country has launched a National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS), as well as creating various institutions to drive the implementation of that strategy since constitutional reforms implemented in 2013. Particularly concerning are the disproportionate impacts of corruption on specific segments in society. As the 2019 GCB noted, "bribery does not affect all people equally, it hits the poorest harder than the wealthiest - often denying people access to critical healthcare, education and legal protections, with devastating consequences." As a grassroots-led anti-corruption CSO, we are therefore primarily motivated to carry out such studies with a view to highlighting the impacts of corruption on the full enjoyment of human rights by the

most vulnerable in society.

Over and above the human impact aspect of corruption, TI Z is also motivated to contribute to the strengthening of public institutions from a civic perspective. Indeed, the National Development Strategy (NDS1) recognises the need to develop and capacitate key national institutions, which will create the enabling environment critical for transformative economic growth. We therefore assert that any ongoing or planned public sector reform programmes should include the agenda to fight corruption in this sector.

With the foregoing in mind, TI Z invites stakeholders to review the findings of this study and take the study as an opportunity to strengthen calls for fighting corruption and promote transparency, accountability, and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of society.

Tafadzwa Chikumbu

TI Z Executive Director
April 2022

The findings indicated that there is high demand for, or acceptance of bribes by public officials. In other words, there was transferability of corruption from public and political institutions to the private sector.

Tafadzwa Chikumbu
TI Z Executive Director



LIST OF ACRONYMS

AU	-	African Union
CHS	-	Commission on Human Security
CBOs	-	Community-based organisations
CNRG	-	Centre for Natural Resource Governance
CPI	-	Corruption Perception Index
CSO	-	Civil Society Organisation(s)
COVID-19	-	Corona Virus Disease 2019 caused by SARS-CoV-2
FGDs	-	Focus Group Discussions
GCB	-	Global Corruption Barometer
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
KII	-	Key Informant Interviews
NDS 1	-	National Development Strategy
MPs	-	Members of Parliament
NACS	-	National Anti-Corruption Strategy
NPA	-	National Prosecuting Authority
NBPI	-	National Bribes Payers Index
PEPs	-	Politically Exposed Persons
RG	-	Registrar General
SACU	-	Special Anti-Corruption Unit
SDG	-	Sustainable Development Goals
TI Z	-	Transparency International Zimbabwe
VID	-	Vehicle Inspection Department
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UN	-	United Nations
UNODC	-	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WB	-	World Bank (WB)
ZACC	-	Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission
ZEC	-	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
ZRP	-	Zimbabwe Republic Police

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings of the National Bribes Payers Index (NBPI) study conducted by Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI Z) from April-July 2021. The study aims to explore the dynamics of bribery within the public sector and gain insights on the public's perceptions of existing gaps and opportunities in the fight against corruption. The study applied the Human Security and Good Governance analytical frameworks.

2,583 respondents from both rural and urban areas

54,4% have been asked to pay a bribe in the last 12 months

45,2% expressed lack of confidence with NACS

58,9% expressed lack of confidence with ZRP

43,1% expressed lack of confidence with ZACC

The study was national in scope, covering all provinces in the country and reaching out to 2,583 respondents from both rural and urban areas. The study employed a mixed methods approach of data gathering, combining data collected from survey questionnaires, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs).

Key findings from the study show that bribery in Zimbabwe is rampant and exists within most public institutions. Among the respondents surveyed, 54.4 % indicated that they have been asked to pay a

bribe within the last 12 months. The situation has been further worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic restrictive measures which inhibit citizens' access to goods and services. For most Zimbabweans, survival is closely linked to paying bribes (monetary and non-monetary) to public officials. Thus, most public officials directly or indirectly request bribes from service seeking citizens.

From this survey, the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the Registrar General's office (RG), and Vehicle Inspection Department (VID) were ranked as the top three institu-

tions with bribe seeking tendencies respectively.

The major factors driving the demand for bribes by public sector officials were cited as weak and unaccountable institutions which have spawned a culture of impunity. Respondents pointed out that most of the public sector institutions are severely incapacitated in the face of demand for public goods and services. This presents public officials with an opportunity to extort bribes from the public. Examples include the lack of capacity to efficiently process passports, to provide serviced residential or commercial stands and adequate places for school enrolment, which all leads to the payment of bribes for people to get preferential treatment. Participants also cited the poor remuneration of civil servants, which exacerbates the demand for bribes for people to access public services. The bribe seeking behaviour within the public sector is further worsened by poor working conditions.

Another key finding was the lack of public confidence expressed with current public sector anti-corruption efforts in Zimbabwe. Of the 2,583 surveyed respondents, 45, 2 % expressed lack of confidence with ongoing initiatives such as the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) and other supportive

legislative frameworks that were introduced by the government of Zimbabwe. Additionally, there is a general lack of public confidence in most institutions pivotal to the fight against corruption. About 58.9 % expressed lack of confidence with the ZRP, whilst 43,1% expressed lack of confidence with the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC). Throughout the study respondents narrated their experiences with these institutions and how they failed to respond in a timely and efficient manner to cases which they reported. In their view, the lack of professional etiquette, politically biased appointments and limited resources inhibit effective institutional response within ZACC, ZRP and National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).

Participants recommended the strengthening and proper funding of public sector institutions so that they can effectively meet the demand for goods and services from the citizens, thereby reducing the demand for bribes. Participants also recommended the strengthening of ZACC and allied law enforcing agencies to effectively fight corruption. They also recommended the de-politicisation of ZACC, the police and virtually all public sector institutions so that they can serve the public fairly.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Zimbabwe has consistently performed poorly on the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), among other global governance indices. Studies on corruption in Zimbabwe have focused on examining the public sector through identifying the forms of corruption (Rusvingo, 2014; Tizora, 2019; TI Z, 2021), impact of corruption (Bonga et al: 2015, Muzurura, 2019) and the role of institutions in responding to corruption (Moyo, 2014). Consequently, little attention has been paid on the role (active or otherwise) of the citizens in illicit transactions. There is a general acceptance of the rampant levels of corruption in Zimbabwe. Citizens participate voluntarily or through coercion in underhand activities to access goods and services. A functional society requires both citizens and state institutions to be accountable. The World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) acknowledge that accountable governance requires not only effective 'supply-side' (government institutions) conditions but effective 'demand-side' (citizens) conditions as well

Zimbabwe's aspirations of attaining an upper middle-class economy by 2030 will require institutions that are built on just and peaceful foundations.

Zimbabwe's aspirations of attaining an upper middle-class economy by 2030 will require institutions that are built on just and peaceful foundations. Accordingly, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Number 16 (in figure 1.1) underlines the need for peace, justice and strong

institutions as building blocks for sustainable peace and development. There is a strong instrumental link between corruption and lack of accountability within public institutions.

Figure 1.1: Sustainable Development Goal Number 16



Source: UN SDGS¹

.....

The African Union (AU) estimates that 25% of Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is lost to corruption (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

- UNODC, 2015.

Some of the targets linked to SDG16 are very clear on the need to reduce the incidences of corruption for sustainable socio-economic transformation. Targets 16.4, 16.5 and 16.6 specifically refer to the need for reducing all forms of corruption, strengthening the recovery and return of stolen assets, and developing transparent institutions. The African Union (AU) estimates that 25% of Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is lost to corruption (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - UNODC, 2015). This could be a conservative figure given the fact that most African countries have not performed well in many of the human security related indices. Aidt (2010) examined the relationship between corruption and sustainable development. He pointed out that there is a negative correlation between corruption and growth, and that corruption can put a country on an unsustainable path in which its capital base is seriously eroded.

Zimbabwe's pursuit of Vision 2030 (Upper Middle-Income Economy) and the success of the National Development Strategy (NDS 1) will be anchored on the existence of strong institutions that are both accountable and effective in delivering goods and services to the citizens and the world at large. These institutions must be effective in dealing with corruption which is viewed as a pervasive phenomenon that continues to affect humanity in many undesirable ways.

For countries in transition, corruption negatively affects the capabilities of countries to achieve human security and thus under-

mining the conditions necessary to guarantee a decent and safe life for individuals. Transition countries are those undergoing transformation from authoritarian systems (IGI Global, n.d.). Zimbabwe which fits in this category has not been spared from the effects of corruption.

The prevalence of corruption in the country, and lack of political will to address it remains high, and this threatens the successful realisation of key developmental goals contained in blueprints like the aforementioned NDS 1, the African Union Agenda 2063 and the United Nations (UN) Agenda 2030, more commonly referred to as SDGs).

1.2. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study was to assess citizens’ perceptions and experiences on corruption with officials in all sectors of government. It focused on the interaction between ordinary Zimbabwean citizens and selected public sector institutions in the country. This includes government ministries, agencies, parastatals and local government institutions like urban municipalities, town councils, local boards, and rural district councils.

The findings are mainly based on a survey, which reached out to all the 10 provinces of Zimbabwe. The survey sought participants’ views on their experiences with bribery, whether they had bribed any public official in recent times, rank/position of the official, the range of amounts that were paid to the officials, and the name of the government institution where the official(s) came from.

The survey specifically focused on questions relating to the following key performance indicators:



- **Incidence** – the frequency of bribe seeking behaviour by public officials

- **Prevalence** – the number of people that paid bribes to access services in the public sector



- **Bribe Size** – average amount of money spent on bribes by individuals

- **Severity** – implications and consequences of bribe refusal





- **Government Response** – whether government is doing enough to combat bribery and corruption in general.

Considering the foregoing, this NBPI sought to ascertain the extent to which citizens participate in transactions that qualify as bribery and corruption, their perceptions regarding the most corrupt public sector institutions and the reasons driving these illicit transactions. This survey focused on the nature, prevalence, and impact of corruption viewed from the perspective of human security, and to explore the prevalence of bribery in all public sectors in Zimbabwe.

The NBPI survey was guided by the following objectives:

- **GATHER** information on bribe size and costs
- **RECORD** the perceptions of citizens on corruption
- **GATHER** information on citizen's experiences and perceptions of the public sector corruption
- **ANALYSE** the commitment and effectiveness of existing strategies to curtail corruption in Zimbabwe
- **ASSESS** the impact of corruption on the human security of citizens

The study combined quantitative and qualitative aspects relating to bribes payment in Zimbabwe. The first part of the report presents the quantitative findings, whilst the last part presents the qualitative ones.

1.3 ANALYTICAL APPROACH: THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK

The report was framed within the context of human security, with a view to seeing how it can be enhanced through good governance. There is need to ensure that the country has sound governance structures to ensure social, economic and cultural development. Good governance implies the existence of a network of institutions which combine with appropriate laws and regulations to create and maintain an

environment in which human development can take root for the benefit of all groups in society. Figure 1.1 below presents a graphic illustration of how the United Nations (2009) envisages how this network of systems works.

Figure 2.1: Elements of Good Governance



The idea of human security revolutionised the world's understanding of security, by challenging the traditional view of national security as military security. As the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) insists, its focus is humanity's 'freedom from want and freedom from fear' (UNDP, 1994). Similarly, the United Nation's Commission on Human Security (CHS) defines human security as entailing the;

Safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats ...as a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to [their] rights, their safety, or even their lives ...taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments. - (UN CHS, 2003, p.23).



This viewpoint was echoed by former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who argued that economic development, social justice, environment protection, democratisation and respect for human rights and the rule of law should be encompassed in the definition of human security (Annan 2005). Annan's conceptualisation of the notion of human security resonates with that of the UNDP which listed seven specific critical dimensions of human security, namely; food, health, personal, the environment, economic, political and community. The theoretical lenses helped to contextualise the challenges presented by bribe-seeking behaviours from public officials as well as the problems resulting from citizens who voluntarily partake in bribe payments. The main assumption was that bribe seeking behaviour was largely a symptom of a serious lack of sound governance systems within the public sector (which was the focus of the study) and that it undermines all the elements of good governance, i.e. accountability, transparency, inclusivity, participation, efficiency, effectiveness and the rule of law. When this occurs, the foundations of human security are shaken and citizens are left vulnerable.

In this context, an often-overlooked threat to both state and human security is corruption, despite being a more pervasive and ultimately deadly challenge. This is because corruption has far-reaching effects on the lives of people across the world, particularly the vulnerable


members who often find themselves struggling to access social amenities. As Manzaris (2017) observed, “corruption comprises of a range of unethical and deviant activities that pervade the private and public sectors of a given country...with greater consequences for the citizens.”

1.4 THE ZIMBABWEAN CONTEXT

The Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) provides for the establishment and composition of institutions to combat corruption and crime as outlined in Chapter 13. These include the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). There have been efforts to tackle corruption by the country’s authorities, but citizens remain apprehensive. They feel that the authorities are not genuine as they also benefit from corrupt activities.

The “*Second Republic*”, under President Mnangagwa introduced a Special Anti-Corruption Unit (SACU) to work closely with

the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), ZACC and other stakeholders in the fight against corruption in the country. SACU is housed in the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC). The Presidency justified the creation of SACU as a way of improving operational efficiency in the fight against corruption.



However, despite all these seemingly capable institutions, corruption remains rampant in the country. Successive iterations of the global Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency International show that the country ranks among the most corrupt in the world with a score of 23/100 in 2021.

Recent reports have shown that there is rampant smuggling of minerals from Zimbabwe and that there seems to be a lack of political will to arrest the haemorrhage (Africa Report, 2020; Centre for Natural Resource Governance, 2021; TI Z, 2021). The

same concern has been raised regarding the permeability of the country's borders where smuggling of various goods including drugs and even human beings has been taking place. Zimbabwe loses an estimated of USD100 million annually from mineral revenue (Chamisa, 2020).

There has been calls for a lifestyle audit for civil servants in particular sectors of government because citizens feel that some of them enjoy lifestyles that are way beyond their means. In local government, local authorities have huge housing backlogs, which have sparked conflicts relating to the allocation of residential and commercial stands. The demand for stands has superseded the ability to supply, and as such, the waiting lists are no longer followed, but one's access to the stands depends on how much they are willing to pay the duty bearers. All these issues are evidence of the extent of corruption in a country, which ironically has an architecture of laws, institutions, and policies put in place to curb corruption. Indeed, the phenomenon must be studied and documented to give citizens and policy makers deeper understanding to enable meaningful actions towards fostering accountability in both the public and the private sectors. The foregoing summarises the social and political context in which this study was commissioned.

The mining sector has been marred by illicit flows of minerals, a case in point involves Ms. Henrietta Rushwaya, the then President of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation (ZMF) who was allegedly caught attempting to smuggle gold worth USD\$330 000 out of the country at the Robert Gabriel Mugabe airport. This shows how the politically exposed persons (PEPs) have been taking advantage of the porous borders and weak accountability systems which as a result costs the nation millions of dollars.

1. <https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2020/11/06/rushwaya-arrest-a-case-of-rampant-elite-corruption/?msclkid=ce6c1dc-6b1a911ecadeafe84899ffde1>

2.0 METHODOLOGY

2.1. SAMPLING FORMULA

With about 3.1 million households in Zimbabwe, there is a 50% chance of a single household encountering corruption in Zimbabwe (Zimstats, 2012). The questionnaire was administered to a total of 2,583 participants in all the 10 provinces in Zimbabwe. Survey respondents were selected using a combination of purposive and random sampling techniques. Purposive sampling was meant to ensure that the study tapped into the insights and experiences of the stakeholders that were deemed relevant to the research questions. Random sampling was used to ensure that respondents are selected for an accurate representation of the larger populations since each member of the larger population had an equal

opportunity for selection. The study had a 95% confidence level and the proportion of households in the population with at least 0.5 chances of encountering corruption. This is a point estimate of 1.96 with a margin of error of 0.059.

$$\begin{aligned}
 P &= x/n \\
 Q &= 1-p \\
 E &= z\sqrt{(pq/n)} \\
 N &= \frac{z^2pq}{E^2}
 \end{aligned}$$

The survey relied on a closed-ended questionnaire as the primary data collection tool. The questionnaire was designed to collect views from citizens with regards their per-

Of **3.1 million** households in Zimbabwe, there is a **50%** chance of a single household encountering corruption

The study had **95%** confidence level.

A total of **46** interviews were held with government officials, private sector and CSO representatives

7 FDGs were conducted in Macheke, Mutoko, Harare, Bulawayo, Gwanda, Hwange and Masvingo. with an average of **10** participants each.

ceptions on bribe payment and or demands from public serving officials to receive such payments. Interviews with representatives of CSOs, community-based organisations (CBOs), academia and others were conducted to provide triangulated data for analysis. The data gathering team utilised telephone interviews due to challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

2.2. DATA GATHERING

The researchers employed a mixed methods approach, with the first part of the study reaching a total of 2,583 respondents across the country with survey questionnaires. The study utilised interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) for in-depth analysis of the issues relating to bribes payment in the country. A total of 46 KIIs interviews were held with government officials, private sector and civil society organisation (CSO) representatives. Seven FGDs were held in Masvingo, Gweru, Harare, Macheke, Mutare, Mutoko, Bulawayo, Gwanda and Hwange (see annex 3.9 for details).

For key informant interviews (KIIs), the re

search team used purposive sampling, targeting broad-based engagements with experts and professionals within the public sector- ranging from health practitioners, police officers, academics, private sector institutions, prosecutors, civil society activists, Members of Parliament (MPs), local authorities, and gender experts. A total of 7 Focus Group Discussions (FDGs) were conducted in Macheke, Mutoko, Harare, Bulawayo, Gwanda, Hwange and Masvingo. On average each FGD comprised 10 participants.

A pilot exercise to test the validity and reliability of the data collection instruments was conducted by the TI Z's secretariat in Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare.

2.3

JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

In Africa more than half of its citizens think corruption is getting worse in their country and that their government is doing a bad job at tackling corruption.

Global Corruption Barometer
- 2019

This study was necessitated by several factors, particularly the need to provide a scientific explanation of the dynamics of bribery as a form of corruption in the public sector.

The public sector in any country plays a very significant role in ensuring that a country's vision, national goals, and all developmental schemes are realised. Fighting corruption therefore requires an empirical analysis of its causes, drivers, and magnitude to develop effective intervention strategies. This study is important in the context of the country's efforts to transform and improve the efficiency of the public sector. According to the NDS 1 launched by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development

(MoFED), critical enablers for this strategy will include:

- Well-coordinated and directed Government machinery;
- Change management;
- Public sector transformation that deal comprehensively with aspects of, corruption, silo mentality and accountability; and
- Relevant and motivated human resources.

Considering the above, this study was significant in that it focused on the key enablers towards realising NDS 1. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2016, p.11) also indicates that “transparent, accountable and inclusive public institutions serve as the cornerstones for the state to provide the citizens their basic human rights.” This study makes a significant contribution towards ensuring transparency, accountability, and inclusivity in public institutions. In recent years, corruption has been branded a threat to national security (Carnegie Endowment, 2014) and therefore it is everyone’s responsibility to contribute in different ways in fighting the scourge.

2.4. SERVICE USERS’ EXPERIENCES AND BRIBE SEEKING BEHAVIOUR IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

This section assessed the prevalence of bribery within public sector institutions in Zimbabwe. Experiences and perceptions of citizens were captured as they seek and interact with public officials.

3.1 PERCEPTIONS OF BRIBERY WITHIN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Perceptions do matter in shaping and understanding the discourse on anti-corruption. As highlighted above, Zimbabwe has made significant initiatives in responding to corruption, within the last three years, the government and other key political actors have underlined government's willingness to develop and set up measures against corruption.

The anti-corruption commitment by the government of Zimbabwe can be analysed from the lenses of budget allocation and policy statements by key government actors. National budget statements by MoFED since 2016 indicates that responding to corruption is a priority as it inhibits national economic development (MoFED, 2016, 2017, 2018). Specific allocations to ZACC aimed at combatting corruption are shown in table 3.1

Table 3.1: Annual Budgetary Allocations to the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission

Year	ZACC Budget allocation	Allocations as % of total annual budget
2018	USD\$ 3,351,000	0,07
2019	USD\$ 6,000,000	0,09
2020	ZWL \$ 72,000,000 (EST USD\$847,000)	0,11
2021	ZWL \$ 317,000,000 (EST USD \$3,700,000)	0,09

Source: National Financial Budgets, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development

However, despite these allocations, the ZACC has continued to raise issues of limited budget allocation and late disbursements by National Treasury. Presenting these challenges before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on the 11th of October 2019, ZACC Commissioner

Chaibva indicated,


“... we have challenges of disbursement and to date, which is two months before the end of the year, only 56% of that budget has been disbursed, and unless government gives us money, we will be unable to move forward”²



There have been efforts in resourcing ZACC and other anti-corruption institutions such as the ZRP.

Despite these efforts, citizens think that bribe seeking behaviour has increased within the public sector within the last three years. As shown in figure 3.1. The majority of the respondents, 76.7% believe that bribery as a form of corruption has been on the increase in the past 3 years in Zimbabwe, while 13.4% were not so sure that corruption may have increased over the past few years. Ten percent of the participants felt that bribery as a form of corruption had not really increased.

Fig 3.1 Perceptions of Bribery in the past Three Years



Source: Data from Survey Questionnaire (Fieldwork Data)

These indicated that corruption within the public sector was high during the period under review. Although participants believe that corruption was always on the increase, they seemed to acknowledge that COVID-19 exacerbated its prevalence (see quotes below).

Most institutions now request a bribe for you to get a service, which is now the norm. COVID-19 especially in the last year necessitated that increase. As citizens we were forced to seek letters and clearances from the police to travel and acquire goods and services in the city centre or industrial sites.. The police officers demanded a “small token” of appreciation for a clearance. Also, a bribe was required at roadblocks for you to pass through during the lockdown. So...COVID-19 has worsened the situation

- **respondent in Bulawayo during an FGD.** (2021)

In this context, COVID-19 has had a direct impact on increased levels of corruption. Previous studies have highlighted that in emergencies, corruption or bribe seeking behaviour is noted in procurement processes (Lambsdorff 2006; Schultz and Søreide 2008). However, in the context of “fragile states” where institutions are weak, bribe seeking behaviour within the public sector increases as people seek various goods and services. The continued restrictions and scarcity of services partly contributes to increased levels of bribery.

3.2 MOST FREQUENTED PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS

Respondents were asked which public sector institution they visited or interacted with in the last 12 months. The 12 months included the period covering government measures to mitigate against the spread of COVID 19 so this pattern may change in future studies. The highest


ranked institutions in terms of total number of interactions recorded from those surveyed was the ZRP (951), the Vehicle Inspection Department, VID (652), Ministry of Health and Child Care (483), Local Authorities (460) and the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, ZIMRA (319). Local authorities also got a significant number of visits at 460.

From the information shared by Participants, it was noted that some public service institutions have more interface with citizens compared to others presumably because they provide the most needed services to society. Institutions like the birth registry offices would ordinarily serve a lot of people daily but their operations were hamstrung by the current COVID-19 induced lockdowns. Most responses in this survey tended to focus on those offices and institutions that were functional during the lockdown period in Zimbabwe. Figure 3.2 summarises responses on institutions most visited in the last 12 months.

Bribery in public service delivery compels citizens to pay for services that should be free of extra monetary charge


- Bohórquez and Devrim (2012)

Fig 3.2 Most Frequented Public Sector Institutions




As figure 3.3 shows about seventy-five percent of the survey respondents indicated that they had interacted with public sector institutions between 1-3 times a month, and 14.8% reported having visited the same between 4-6 times per month, more than 7 times a month.

Fig 3.3: Frequency of Visits to a Public Sector Institution



3.3 BRIBE OFFERING OR REQUESTING TENDENCIES

Respondents were surveyed on whether they offered offer a bribe or an inducement of any kind to a public officer/civil servant. Out of the 2,527 responses, 61.4% said they had not made an offer, whilst 32% admitted that they had (see Fig. 3.4 below). Respondents were also asked whether they were asked for a bribe or an inducement of any kind by a public officer during their visits. Out of 2,450 responses, 54.4% said they had indeed been asked for a bribe, whilst 37.3% said they had not (see Fig. 3.4 below.) When viewed together the responses to the two questions demonstrate that bribe paying tendencies are driven from the institutions themselves, rather than citizens.

Fig 3.4: Bribe Offering and Requesting Tendencies

3.4 VALUE OF THE BRIBES

Respondents were asked to indicate how much they paid towards bribes. Of the 1,357 participants 38% indicated that their bribes payments ranged from US\$1-US\$10 while 31.7% specified that their bribe payments ranged from US\$11-US\$50. 19.7% reported that their paid bribes ranged from US\$51-US\$100 and 9.4% reported that their paid bribes ranged from US\$101-US\$501. About 0.2% of the participants indicated that they had paid bribes of more than US\$500. Figure 3.5 shows the percentages of different categories of people who paid specific ranges of amounts towards bribery.

38% indicated that their bribes payments ranged from **US\$1-US\$10**

31.7% specified that their bribe payments ranged from **US\$11-US\$50**


19.7% reported that their paid bribes ranged from **US\$51-US\$100**

9.4% reported that their paid bribes ranged from **US\$101-US\$501**

0.2% of the participants indicated that they had paid bribes of more than **US\$500**


The statistics show that on average citizens seeking services within the public sector pay up to US\$50 to access a service. This figure is generally high when juxtaposed with the Zimbabwe Statistical Agency (ZimStats) food poverty line of \$ZWL 4,139.10 (est. US \$48, 70). More importantly the findings show that most citizens are losing an average 10 percent of their monthly disposable income to bribery as they seek various services within the public sector.

Fig 3.5: Amount of Bribery Paid



Only a few participants (9,8%) indicated that they paid non-monetary bribes to public officials. The majority (85.5%) indicated that they had never paid non-monetary bribes while 4.7% indicated that they may have paid some non-monetary bribes to public officials. Non-monetary payments mentioned included such things as sexual favours, food and gold among other things. Most of the respondents who indicated that they had offered food are largely informal traders. There is a sense that bribe seeking and bribe paying behaviour by citizens and public sector officials alike depends on the nature of service(s) being sought by the citizens and what they can afford. Thus, it can be noted that the payment of bribes is rampant and is driven by various factors.


Figure 3.6 shows the percentage of surveyed people offering non-monetary bribes to public officials and the type of bribes offered.

Fig 3.6: % Giving Non-monetary Favours

3.5 POINT AT WHICH BRIBES ARE PAID

Respondents who revealed that they had paid a bribe were asked at which point they did so in their interactions with public institutions. Of this group, the majority (49,2 %) indicated that they paid *before* accessing the service followed by 38,6% saying they paid after they were convinced that they would not get the service if they didn't pay. Only 12,2% showed that they paid part payment before accessing the needed services and the balance after receiving the payment.

Fig 3.7: Point at which bribes are paid




3.6 How the bribes were requested

Respondents were asked how public official/s requested bribes from them. About 39.8% indicated that that most cases bribes are collected through third parties as shown in Fig 3.8. This is supported by responses in all the FGDs where respondents revealed that bribe seeking behaviour within the public sector is well coordinated involving intermediaries between bribe takers and payers. A case in point is the VID section, where the officers work closely with driving instructors who collect bribes on their behalf.

About 29 % of the respondents indicated that some public officials asked for the bribes directly from them. while 21.3% indicated that they offered the bribes themselves due to pressing circumstances. This brings out the theme of scarcity or unequal access to public services, creating opportunities or incentives for corrupt behaviour. A sizable portion of the participants (9.8%) indicated that they were coerced into paying the bribes to access the services that they needed.

Public officials who request for bribes are well coordinated- it will be difficult to fully trace the bribery line fully. For example, officials at passport office work with those “boys” whom you find milling around public offices. Those “boys” are the ones that vet you and can easily facilitate a faster way of processing your application.

Respondent in Masvingo-FGD. (2021)

Fig 3.8: How bribes are solicited

3.7 Resistance to Bribe Payment/Offering

Some respondents (956 responses) however indicated that they did not pay a bribe. In this instance it was necessary to find out reasons why. In this category the majority, 43.8% said they did not pay the bribes because they do not condone corruption, and 40.7% indicated that they simply could not pay because they did not have the money.

4.0 PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTION RATINGS

Respondents were asked to rank the public service institution in Zimbabwe which they considered to be the most corrupt from a sample of 12. The rankings are based on citizen experiences and relations with corruption in the respective institutions. The table 4.1 shows percentages and rankings of government institutions.

Table 4.1: Perceptions about most corrupt public sector institutions in Zimbabwe

No	Institution	Percentage score
1	Zimbabwe Republic Police	38,9 %
2	Vehicle Inspection Department	18,9 %
3	Registrar's Office	15.1 %
4	Zimbabwe Revenue Authority	6.4 %
5	Local authorities (urban and rural councils)	5.1 %
6	Judiciary/ courts	3.8 %
7	Ministry of Health and Child Care	3.3 %
8	Ministry of Lands, agriculture, and rural settlements	2.6 %
9	Ministry of Mines and mining development	1.9%
10	Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture	1.8%
11	Zimbabwe Prison Services	0.9%
12	Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education	0.8%

They were also asked to give reasons, and Table 4.2 provides selected responses given for the five top ranked institutions:


Table 4.2: Reasons for the ratings

Government Department	Reasons for ranking the institution with high bribe seeking behaviour
Zimbabwe Republic Police	Manual entry of dockets and criminal records are. Prone to manipulation and people can easily bribe for dockets to be withdrawn.
	There are poor case handling management systems within the police and limited follow up mechanisms of all cases.
	Police frequently abuse their authority and demand bribes on unsuspecting public. This promotes a culture of corruption within the public service
	There are poor systems and mechanisms for citizens to report corrupt officials within the police department. There are no safeguarding policies that enhance accountability of the police force.
Vehicle Inspection Department	They allow unroadworthy vehicles on the road. The system is full of bottlenecks and lacks openness creating opportunities for bribe taking
Registrar's Office	They have failed to meet demand for travel documents leaving the system open to abuse by their officials.
ZIMRA	The borders are porous enabling smuggling and there is lack of integrity among the customs officials.
Local Authorities	Public Procurement and tender systems are weak and prone to manipulation by PEPs. Allocation of land is not transparent in most local authorities

4.1 CITIZEN’S AWARENESS OF INSTITUTIONS DEALING WITH CORRUPTION IN ZIMBABWE

Respondents were surveyed for their awareness of institutions mandated to deal with corruption in Zimbabwe. The majority (69,3%) indicated that they were aware of the institutions mandated to deal with corruption in Zimbabwe. However, a significant number that constituted 23.7% of the respondents indicated that they were not aware of these institutions. Only 7% of the participants showed that they were not totally sure of the institutions, but they may have an idea (See figure 4.1). These findings point to the greater need for institutions like ZACC, ZRP and other anti-corruption agencies to come up with a sensitisation strategy of their work, and anti-corruption strategies as well as developing other civic-related awareness raising interventions. Although a significant number of people are aware of the anti-corruption institutions, a sizable number are yet to be conscientized and engage these institutions.

Fig 4.1: Awareness of Anti-corruption Institutions in Zimbabwe



Respondents were asked whether they reported incidences after they had to pay a bribe or had been asked to by a public official. The vast majority (71.6%) indicated that they shared

experiences of bribe payment or requests for bribes by public officials with family members or friends. Only a small percentage reported to the ZRP and even less to ZACC. Even less said they did not report to anyone.

This finding has serious implications for efficacy of current national anti-corruption strategies and related institutions. When juxtaposed with the finding that the highest number of interactions among those surveyed was with the ZRP at 951 [see Figure 3.2 above], it begs the question why respondents *did not* report corruption to the Police. It raises questions on *what* the public is mainly doing in their engagements with the ZRP, if not to report corruption. The implications are more concerning when one considers findings further down showing low levels of public confidence in the ZRP among surveyed respondents.


4.2 Confidence with Existing Institutions Mandated to Deal with corruption

Respondents were surveyed on their confidence levels with institutions mandated to deal with corruption. Quite concerning is the finding that the majority of respondents (54.6%) expressed lack of confidence with these institutions. A further 26.4% indicated that they were somewhat confident with the institutions. Only a small portion of about 12.2% showed that they were very confident with the existing institutions. A further 8.8% indicated that they were confident with the institutions. When viewed against the finding of high awareness of institutions dealing with corruption (69,3%), this indicates that these institutions are not responding to public expectations of delivering on their mandate. It means people are *aware* of the terms of reference of these institutions or what they are supposed to get from them but not getting it. Figure 4.3 summarises the percentage of respondents expressing their confidence levels with anti-corruption institutions.

4.3 Confidence with Police Efforts to Arrest Corruption in the Country

Respondents were surveyed on their confidence with ZRP. Efforts to arrest corruption in the country on a Likert scale of 5, with 1 being not confident and 5 very confident. The majority (58.4%) as shown in Fig 4.4 indicated that they did not have confidence at all with the police. A further 20.7% showed that they were not confident and only about 10.7% showed that they were somewhat confident with the work that the ZRP is doing. Only 3.9% showed that they have confidence with the work that the ZRP is doing in fighting corruption. Just 6.3% of the participants were very confident of the work that the ZRP is doing in the country.

Fig 4.4: Confidence with the Zimbabwe Republic Police



These statistics show that that the citizens have very little confidence in the ZRP and explains why they hardly report incidences of bribe seeking behaviour to anyone other than to family and friends. The reason maybe that most citizens see it as a waste of time to report the cases as the ZRP is perceived to be ineffective in dealing with the issues.

4.4 Confidence with the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission

Respondents were surveyed on their level of confidence with ZACC's efforts in responding to corruption on a Likert scale of 1-5, with 1 being not confident and 5 very confident. Fig 4.5 summarises responses on the confidence levels with ZACC. Out of the 2,334 participants who responded to this question, the majority (43.1%) showed that they did not have confidence at all in the work that the ZACC is doing, while 24% indicated that they were not confident. Only 14.2% showed that they were somehow confident with the work of ZACC. A small section of the participants, 6.6% showed that they had confidence in the work of the commission. Only 12.1% expressed total confidence with the work that ZACC was doing in the fight against corruption.

Fig 4.5: Confidence in the ZACC efforts




It can be noted that respondents had low confidence in both the ZACC and the ZRP. However, participants were marginally confident with the ZACC compared to ZRP. Overall, the two organisations have a lot to do to win the confidence of the public

4.5 Awareness of the Zimbabwe National Anti-Corruption Strategy

Respondents were surveyed on their awareness of the Zimbabwe’s National Anti-corruption Strategy (NACS). The majority (59.3%) shown in Figure 4.6 said they were not familiar with the NACS. Only 33.6% indicated that they were aware of the NACS. About 7.1% of the participants were not very confident of their knowledge of the NACS. They may have heard something about it but they probably were not sure of what the strategy entails.


Fig 4.6: Awareness of the ZACC Anti-Corruption Strategy



The pattern is disturbing as most of the participants showed lack of awareness. The responses are a sign that ZACC, the custodian of NACS, needs deeper engagement with local communities to make the strategy a success.

4.6 Confidence in the National Anti-Corruption Strategy in Developing Anti-Corruption Frameworks

Respondents were surveyed on their level of confidence with NACS in developing anti-corruption frameworks on a linkert scale of 5, with 1 being not confident and 5 very confident. Not surprisingly, 45% of the participants shown in Figure 4.7, indicated that they did not have confidence in the NACS.

Fig 4.7: Confidence with the ZACC Strategy

Participants who participated in the questionnaire survey believe that there is no “political will” to operationalize the strategy. Participants observed that ZACC was instead chasing seemingly insignificant issues like the issues of extra lessons by teachers at the expense of more serious acts of corruption such as the abuse of Command Agriculture resources and improper handling of public sector tenders particularly in parastatals, ministries and other government agencies.

5.0 QUALITATIVE INSIGHTS INTO BRIBES PAYMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN ZIMBABWE

Apart from the survey questionnaire that was shared with more than 2,000 participants across Zimbabwe, the study also considered some qualitative elements to gain a much deeper insight into the dynamics of bribes payment and bribe seeking behaviour in the public sector in Zimbabwe. Twenty-two interviews were conducted in Mashonaland East, Mashonaland Central, and Harare provinces (see annex 3.9 for details). The findings are presented and analysed in the following sections.

5.1 WHETHER BRIBERY HAS INCREASED IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR WITHIN THE PAST 5 YEARS

Essentially all the FGD participants agreed that bribery has increased over the last five years. Participants in FGDs that were held in Macheke (Mashonaland East Province), Masvingo (Masvingo Province) and in Harare (Harare Metropolitan Province) were all convinced that incidences of bribery were actually on the increase. Participants flagged out the Registrar General's (RG's) offices particularly the Birth Registry Offices, National Identity Documents and Passport Offices as the most notorious in demanding bribes from ordinary citizens.

Other offices that were also mentioned included the Police, the MoHCC, Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education and even the Environmental Management Agency (EMA).

Participants during the Masvingo FGD highlighted that the situation at the RG's offices and the very slow pace at which people are served usually force citizens to consider paying bribes to expedite the process. The participants cited the challenges associated with acquiring passports as an example. They noted that citizens have to join the queue very early in the morning or to sleep on or near the premises so that they can be served when the offices open at 8am (that is if at all they open, particularly during these difficult times were the country is on perpetual lockdown owing to the COVID-19 pandemic). Participants then indicated that one is left with no choice but to participate in underhand dealings to acquire the much-needed passports. Table 5.1 below includes some of the sentiments echoed by participants in the different FGDs that were held in different parts of the country.

Table 5.1. Public Experiences with Corruption**First Experience**

“Corruption is the only way to get the needed services. I had my sister’s daughter who needed a passport to travel, and a middleman told us openly that we needed to pay a certain amount of United States Dollars in order to get the passport. Yet if you go to the registry offices, they will tell you that the office is closed till further notice” (FGD Participant in Mutoko, 15 June 2021).

Second Experience:

“You cannot get most of the services you need unless you pay a bribe. You cannot get a driver’s licence, a stand, a place for your child in grade one and so on. You just have to pay if you want your issues to be attended to” (FGD Participant in Macheke, 14 June 2021)

Third Experience

“ You cannot go to the VID and expect to get a licence without paying. In Marondera they are currently charging anything from US\$100-US\$150 for a class four (light motor vehicle) licence and as much as US\$300 or more for class 2 or class 1. The same applies for those seeking re-test as well. The situation is bad” (FGD Participant in Harare, 7 July 2021)

Fourth Experience

A young man from my ward was fortunate to get a job in South Africa during the lockdown. The young man had all the evidence including the job offer letter but when they got to the RG’s offices, they were told that people are not being served because they were closed. However, out of desperation, the young man had to find ways of offering a bribe to the officials and was eventually able to obtain a passport and travelled. The councillor further lamented, “Corruption in the country is ever increasing because it has become a way of life. It is now difficult to achieve your goals without having to bribe your way out of some situations regardless of the fact that you have all the necessary requirements.” (Councillor, Municipality of Marondera)

Apart from corruption at the RG’s offices, the participants also indicated that it is almost impossible for a person to get a driver’s licence without paying a bribe in Zimbabwe. Some participants indicated that some people are going to the extent of also paying bribes in order to get learners’ licences, officially referred to as Provisional Driver’s Licence (PDL). However,

this trend might soon change as the PDL examination is now being taken online.

5.2 HOW OFTEN DO SERVICE PROVIDERS REQUEST FOR BRIBES WITHIN THE PUBLIC SECTOR?

Interviewees and participants in FGDs all indicated that the bribe seeking behaviours of office bearers in the public sector is rampant and practically institutionalised. Participants cited the examples of the VID where they noted that almost everyone who intends to go for a competency test in order to get a driver's licence is somehow (directly or indirectly) asked for bribes. Instructors at driving schools are the face of these transactions, confirming findings of the survey above.

The seeking of bribes by the public office bearers is so systematic that it becomes very difficult to trace it to them because they are not directly involved in the trans-

actions. The bribes are paid through third parties and in cash. The cash transactions are in United States dollars. In the education sector, the participants indicated that the bribes are seasonal. They are usually high towards the end of the year, September, October and November and early January when parents and guardians are trying to secure school places for their children. This is when the demand for Early Childhood Development (ECD), Grade 1 and Form 1 places is very high.

The demand for bribes at the RGs offices is very high, with incidences noted almost on a daily basis as people apply for new passports or renewal of expired ones. So the demand, according to participants is perennial and thus creating the necessary environment for the officials to demand bribes from those seeking the service(s).

Participants who are either motorists or commuters indicated that bribe seeking behaviour was very frequent on the country's highways. They indicated that it's mostly the illegal pirate taxis, popularly known as "*Mushikashika*" that are more willing to pay bribes to the police details manning the roads in the country. The pirate taxis pay daily amounts of money to the police personnel on duty in order to operate 'freely' without undue interference. Once

the bribes are paid, the pirate taxis acquire freedom' of the routes and will now have the added privilege of overloading their vehicles without even worrying about police presence on the road. This is regardless of the fact that it puts the commuting public at risk of COVID 19 infectious and fatal accidents due to overloading. The accident along the Masvingo-Mbalabala road on the 5th of July 2021 is a case in point where two vehicles, both with a capacity to carry 7 passengers collided and killed 20 people on the spot, with a further 3 later dying in hospital. It is plausible to assert that the vehicles were overloaded after bribes were paid to allow them to pass through various police checkpoints.



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News

20 perish in Zvishavane Road accident

By Newsday · July 5, 2021



Source: <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2021/07/20-perish-in-zvishavane-road-accident/#:~:text=TWENTY%20people%20died%20and%20several,the%20oncoming%20Toyota%20Wish's%20lane.>

Participants also highlighted that the VID officials on the roads who conduct routine checks, mostly for public service vehicles, are also equally corrupt and that they usually ask for higher amounts of bribes and can easily let unroadworthy vehicles pass. Corruption by VID officials managing highway checkpoints, happens to the detriment of the motoring and commuting public because they are exposed to greater risk of accidents on the roads.

Bribe-seeking in urban and rural councils is said to be high when there is sale of council-serviced residential, commercial or industrial stands. Participants noted that most residents prefer council-serviced stands because there is less risk of being defrauded unlike buying from private land developers and co-operatives. However, in most cases, the stands that are serviced by local councils, whether rural or urban, are very few and not sufficient to meet the high demand. This creates the incentive for residents to pay bribes, as well as council officials to demand bribes from prospective land owners. Table 5.2 summarises sentiments from some of the FGD participants regarding corruption and bribe seeking behaviour by council officials.

Table 5.2: Bribe seeking behaviour in Local Councils

“It is known that you cannot get a stand in council unless you pay something significant to the housing officials. If you don’t, you will forever be on the waiting list” (FGD Participant in Macheke, 14 June 2021)

“You can never dream of acquiring a serviced stand from council if you are not willing to bribe them. If you are willing to pay you don’t even need to be on the waiting list and you can acquire as many stands as you can as long as you have the money” (FGD participant in Macheke, 14 June 2021)

5.3 FACTORS FUELLING BRIBES PAYMENT

5.3.1 Dysfunctional Institutions

FGD participants felt that the main factor driving bribe payment and bribe-seeking behaviour in the public sector in Zimbabwe is because most of these institutions are almost dysfunctional owing to underfunding and lack of effective supervision. Participants gave the example of the huge passport backlog at the RG’s office. Everyone who goes there knows that there is a backlog and that if they want a favour or the processing of their documents to be accelerated, they have to pay to get that service done. The Ministry of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage (MoHACH) is on record acknowledging not only the huge passport backlog but also the lack of capacity to fulfil its mandate as a public sector institution offering travel documents to Zimbabweans in all parts of the world (The Herald, 27 October 2021). The newly introduced E-passport system is likely to ease the pressure and clear the backlog.

5.3.2 Inadequacy of Existing Social

Amenities

Another reason that was highlighted by the participants was that the inadequacy of existing public social amenities like primary schools and secondary schools was a major reason why most parents end up offering bribes. Participants observed that in most cases, particularly in urban and peri-urban localities, securing Early Childhood Development (ECD) or grade one places in public institutions was a nightmare for many parents in Zimbabwe. This is because the public schools that service the urban constituencies are no longer adequate for the ever growing population in the country. The same scenario obtains with public secondary school placement particularly for form 1 candidates. Consequently, many parents find themselves under extreme pressure and left without a choice but to offer bribes to those in positions of authority so that they can secure placement for their children.

Participants in FGDs held in Macheke and Mutoko about housing problems, pointed to the scarcity of both residential stands and business stands in urban areas as a challenge. According to them, residents seeking stands from council are forced to offer bribes to council officials with the

hope of getting stands provided by councils which are cheaper than those serviced or developed by private land developers.

5.3.3 Poorly Remunerated Civil Servants

Participants in all the FGDs indicated that one of the major drivers of bribe seeking behaviour among the civil servants is the issue of very poor remuneration in the public sector. It is well-known that civil servants in Zimbabwe are up in arms against their employer over the issue of poor salaries and working conditions. Consequently, most employees take advantage of their positions to extort money from citizens seeking services from their workplace within government institutions. Participants mentioned that most civil servants, particularly those at the VID, and at the ZRP, due to corruption, live lifestyles beyond their incomes; and have no reason to resign from an underpaying public service job. This was cited as a major factor driving corruption and rent-seeking behaviour among many civil service employees in Zimbabwe.

5.3.4 Public Attitude towards corruption

From the discussions with the participants, it was noted that the citizens are also complicit in fuelling bribes. Participants noted that some citizens commit various offenc-

es knowing fully well that they will easily get away with the crimes because they will bribe the officers. Examples relating to road offenses like driving without a driver's licence, sand poaching, poaching of fish were given as some of the most prevalent offences committed by citizens. Some participants observed that some people are generally impatient with queues to the extent that they are willing to pay bribes so that they can be served quickly.

5.3.5 Impunity

Impunity means exemption from punishment or fines: Most FGD participants also pointed out that historically, all the recurring corruption scandals that involve political actors are left unattended. People who are expected to help combat corruption have become complicit in promoting rent-seeking behaviour. No action has been taken to apprehend those people who are responsible, and this has given an open check for bribery to keep on increasing knowing that no action can be taken either by the government or by ZACC. Bribery continues to rise because there is lack of political will that is linked to greed by some senior 'untouchable' politicians, mostly from the ruling party. .

5.4 PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS PERCEIVED TO BE MOST CORRUPT

Participants in the various groups listed the following public sector institutions as being the most corrupt;

- ZRP
- VID
- ZIMRA
- RG's the Passport Office
- Local Government Offices
- Public Service Commission (PSC)
- Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education

There was a consensus among FGD participants and those interviewed that the ZRP is the most corrupt public service institution in the country. The police are more involved with the public and have more day-to-day interaction with the public than any other institution in Zimbabwe. In the streets during the ongoing COVID 19 pandemic, the police have a crosscutting duty in more parts of the country, are therefore more involved with citizens than any other

institution.

The police can arrest any citizen for not wearing a mask, traffic offenses, and public drinking to mention a few so the accused ends up offering bribes to them. A few participants agreed that ZIMRA is the second most corrupt public institution because it works hand-in-glove with the police and because of its connection with the border post where smuggling of goods is rife. One participant noted:

.....

“...in the context of immigration when we are looking at the ports of entry there is less likely a modus operandi or a syndicate in the manner in which they operate making it difficult to apportion blame-shifting to say ZIMRA is the most corrupt, ZRP is the most corrupt and so forth. ZRP and ZIMRA have synergies in the way they operate particularly depending on the platform where corruption occurs in the public sector-

(FGD Participant in Masvingo, 28 July 2021)

.....

Participants agreed that the rating of the most corrupt institution must not be based on the frequency at which bribery is exercised like the case of ZRP but be based on the amounts being taken away from the people per day. Although the police has more frequent interaction with the public

their bribery gains do not exceed those of ZIMRA. The police do so by getting a few dollars as compared to ZIMRA where thousands are lost through bribery.

Participants also noted that the situation at the RG’s Office (particularly the passports section) very chaotic and creates an environment that is convenient for bribe seeking behaviour among the citizens and the public office bearers. Queues for passports are getting long day by day creating incentive for corruption. People are told that their passports will come after a year or two and they do not have any option but to offer a bribe to the responsible authorities. The criteria that they are using for allocating the available material is blamed for creating the existing gap for one to offer them bribes. The police are also responsible for bribery increase in the sense that they make ambiguous charges against a person, often leaving individuals with no choice but to bribe their way out of the difficult situation. Civil servants have developed strategies on how to extort the public of their money.

Similarly, participants agreed that at the VID the culture of bribery has increased over the years. At VID, the instructors will tell you the moment you arrive that you need to set aside at least US\$200 for you to get your license, and failure to do so can re-

sult in failure or poor judgment. Overall, the participants agreed with the fact that COVID-19 is playing a huge part in the increase of bribery. In line with COVID-19 regulations, government authorized Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) branded vehicles as the only public transporter. It is evident now that other means of transport that are operating illegally are paying bribes at every ZRP roadblock. Despite the gazetted curfew timelines, some people openly defy these as they continue travelling using illegal transport and the ZRP is doing practically nothing to control this since they are taking bribes from the illegal drivers. Corruption is evidenced by the extravagant lifestyles of some of the police officers.

5.5 IMPACT OF BRIBERY ON CITIZENS

It can be noted that corruption undermines the efficiency and effectiveness with which public services are discharged. More disturbingly, corruption pushes the value of otherwise ordinary services way beyond the reach of the ordinary people in society. From the interviews and FGDs that were

conducted, it can be noted that most government services or institutions are now compromised as a result of corrupt tendencies by public officials. The situation is further compounded by the fact that most citizens voluntarily participate in corrupt transactions because of the desperate situation that they find themselves in.

From a human security perspective, it can be inferred that corruption undermines the various dimensions of security. Economic, political, food, community, environmental, personal and health security, all of which feed into the architecture of human security, are easily affected by corruption. For example, one participant in a FGD in Mutoko observed;

.....

“If we pay to get licences it simply means that we are also putting our lives in grave danger because most of the incompetent drivers on the roads have led to the loss of lives on our roads. Yet if we had accountable institutions, some of these occurrences could have been avoided”

(Mutoko FGD participant, 15 June 2021)

.....

Other participants lamented the blatant corruption that happens with illegal pirate taxis on Zimbabwe's roads and how this exposes the commuting public to the dangers of overloading, over speeding and commuting using unroadworthy vehicles.

As articulated in the analytical framework, corruption should be seen as a good governance issue. The thriving of corruption at different levels in society is symptomatic of the wider structural and governance challenges in a state entity. The Department for International Development (DfID, 2015, 43) asserts that, "Corruption is a symptom of wider governance dynamics and is likely to thrive in conditions where accountability is weak, and people have too much discretion." In this regard, most FGD participants lamented the weaknesses of various institutions in the public sector and how this has led to the growth of corruption in society. It would appear the government is failing to properly capacitate the institutions as well as to monitor them so that they serve their different mandates. These shortcomings have in turn presented most government bureaucrats with opportunities for corruption-seeking behaviour.

5.6 AWARENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS BY THE ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT

A substantial number of the participants in the FGDs indicated that they were aware of ZACC. However, almost all of them highlighted that they have no confidence in the work that ZACC is doing. This validates the survey findings where a significant number of the participants also indicated the same. One of the participants said,

.....

We are aware of the institutions that are designated to deal with corruption but they are as corrupt as corruption itself. There is Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and Special Anti-Corruption Unit but it's hard to point out the efforts that they are currently making since no convictions have being made,

(Masvingo FGD Participant, 27 July 2021).

.....

Participants also bemoaned the fact that ZACC was avoiding the more high level cor-

ruption issues reported by the media, such as the alleged looting of Command Agriculture funds, inflated public tenders and non-delivery of services whilst they focus on controlling petty, low level issues like holiday and extra lessons by teachers.

Participants criticised the fact that corruption continues to persist because there is a culture of impunity in the country. Those who commit these acts of unethical conduct are often left unscathed. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that most people do not seem to know their rights or even if they do, they do not demand them from the duty bearers.

5.7 CONFIDENCE WITH THE ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS IN ZIMBABWE

There was convergence between the survey results and the FGDs, and interview insights that were shared by participants. The participants expressed lack of confidence in

the anti-corruption efforts being exercised by the assigned institutions. Respondents were convinced that the ZACC, for example, is only independent on paper but cannot really exercise its independence in practice, which defeats the purpose. Participants believe that ZACC is selective in the execution of its mandate. Some participants asserted that ZACC was actually too scared to confront big wig political elites. One of the participants in an FGD in Masvingo said;

“There is a lot of high-sounding nothings on the fight against corruption in Zimbabwe. The institution is more of a political tool than serving their purpose of anti-corruption. Looking at all the scandals that have been brought to them we don't know what happened. All we know is that there are cases but without a single conviction.”

(Masvingo FGD Participant, 28 July 2021)

The lack of prosecutorial powers was also cited as a factor which makes ZACC possibly vulnerable to manipulation. Participants said that ZACC's major weakness is that it does not have prosecuting authority and relies on public prosecutors who take their instructions from the Prosecutor General. Participants agreed that there must be ju-

dicial independence citing South Africa as a case of best practice in terms of its appointment system for judges. Participants also called for inclusivity and objectivity in the selection process of ZACC members. Some participants recommended the following;

- ZACC must be autonomous and have an independent source of funding so that they do not financially rely on government, which tends to manipulate it. .
- ZACC must be backed by strict punitive laws that bring those who are corrupt to justice.
- Increase digital payments systems and reduce physical interactions that often serves as gateways for bribery.
- Offer competitive salaries to civil servants. There should be a balance also in price control.

6. CONCLUSIONS

From the findings and discussions presented above, it can be concluded that bribes payment is rampant in Zimbabwe. It can also be concluded that the citizens are, in most cases, left with no choice but to participate in bribes payment for them to access the much-needed services especially the acquisition of birth certificates, national identity cards and passports, which are essential for educational, health and travel purpose. For instance, children require birth certificates to secure ECD, Grade 1 or Form 1 places. It can also be concluded that the culture of bribes payment is fuelled by several factors in the Zimbabwean context. Major driving factors include the inadequacy of existing public service institutions to provide services to all citizens without necessarily creating a sense of desperation on the part of those seeking services. The other major consideration is the long history of poor remuneration of workers in the public sector. This has tended to provide motivation for civil servants to thrive on bribes in order to make ends meet. The situation is exacerbated by poor monitoring and enforcement mechanisms within most public sector institutions. The survey concluded that the existing institutions that are entrusted with fighting corruption in the country are lacking in terms of strategy and conviction. It is not a coincidence that most participants lamented the lack of effectiveness of such key institutions like the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and the Zimbabwe Republic Police. The existence of widespread corruption is not only a threat to human security but also a serious threat to the country's dreams of achieving SDG16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions and to attain the status of an Upper Middle-Class Economy by 2030. The National Development Strategy 1 is also unlikely to be realised if there are no concerted efforts to tame the ugly head of corruption in the country.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

Table 7.1: Recommendations from the study

Recommendation	Responsible Actors
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There is need to improve awareness of the NACS through various strategies like civic education, television adverts, workshops with citizens, among other things'. 	<p>ZACC and like-minded state and non-state actors.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There is need for continued and improved civic education on the need to resist bribe payment to public service providers and to utilise available platforms to report corruption 	<p>ZACC and other interested stakeholders.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There is need for the capacitation of government departments in order to improve service delivery and accessibility of services and to improve remuneration for the civil servants. 	<p>Government of Zimbabwe</p>

8.0. LIST OF REFERENCES

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
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9.0. ANNEXURE 1: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS


1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTICIPANTS

As shown in fig 3.1, participants ranged from 18 years to above 45 years. All the age ranges were almost fairly presented with the 24-29 age range being the most represented. This was followed closely by the 30-35 age group. The least represented category were the people in the 45 and above age range who constituted 15.1 % of the participants in the survey. They were marginally edged by the 18-23 age range who constituted 15.7% of the participants.

3.1 Age Group




3.2 Gender Characteristics



There was a fair representation of both men and women in the study. 49, 5% of the participants were male with 49, 2% of the participants were female. A very small number of less than 1% indicated that they were LGBTI with another less than 1% opting not to indicate their gender.


3.3 Religious Affiliation



The participants in the study came from diverse religious backgrounds. However, it was only logical that the majority of the participants were Christian. This is because Christianity is the


most practiced religion the country. There was a fair representation of Islam and African Traditional religion followers. A sizeable number of the participants decided not to declare their religious beliefs.

3.4 Level of Education




Most of the participants had at least reached Ordinary Level education (27.7%) and a further 27.7% having attained an undergraduate degree qualification. A fair number of the participants (18.7%) indicated that they had acquired a diploma as their highest qualification. Another 11.5% went up to A-Level. The rest indicated that they had received some vocational training, a few had gone up to the old Zimbabwe Junior Certificate (ZJC) level and a very small percentage had not received any formal education.

3.5 Range of Monthly Income




Out of the 2,412 respondents who completed this section of the questionnaire, 67.2% of the participants indicated that their incomes were less than USD500-00 per month. A sizable 11.4% indicated that they earned between USD501-USD1,000 per month. Other participants preferred not to share their range of income per month (18.5%). However, it is important to note that the majority of the participants are in the low-income category with very little disposable incomes.

3.6 Area of Residence




Most of the participants hailed from urban localities (76.8%) and a sizable percentage of about 11.6% residing in rural areas. A further 11.6% reside in peri-urban areas.

3.7 Marital Status



The majority of the participants (49%) indicated that they are married and a substantial 39.5% also indicated that they were single. There was a fairly notable section of participants who indicated that they were either divorced or widowed and another section that also preferred not to indicate their marital status.

3.8 Participation by Province



There was participation from all the ten provinces in the country. Throughout the study there was a careful attempt to balance the sample size given the population dynamics and accessibility of respondents during the COVID-19 outbreak.

3.9. FGDS PARTICIPANTS AND INTERVIEWEES

FGDs Participants and interviewees

Location	Number of participants
Mutoko	8
Macheke	12
Bulawayo	12
Gwanda	8
Hwange	11
Masvingo	9
Harare	10

Interviews Held

Interviews Held

Location	Number of participants
Bindura, Mashonaland Central	2
Marondera, Mash East	2
Macheke, Mash East	6
Mutoko, Mash East	4
Harare, Harare Metropolitan Province	8
Masvingo, Masvingo Province	4
Gweru, Midlands Province	4
Bulawayo, Bulawayo Metropolitan Province	6
Gwanda, Matabeleland South Province	4
Mutare, Manicaland Province	6

ENDNOTES

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About Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI Z)



Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI Z) is a non-profit, non-partisan, systems-oriented local chapter of the international movement against corruption. Its broad mandate is to fight corruption and related vices through networks of integrity in line with the Global Strategy. TI Z believes corruption can only be sufficiently tackled by all citizens including people at grass root level.



Vision

A Zimbabwean society free from all forms of corruption and practices.



Mission

We exist to be a knowledge-driven and evidence-based anti-corruption civil society organization that practices and promotes transparency, accountability, and integrity in all sectors to achieve good governance.



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